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
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A R E P L Y
TO
VARIOUS OPPONENTS;

PARTICULARLY TO
“ STRICTURES ON COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF
THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA.”

TOGETHER WITH
OBSERVATIONS
ILLUSTRATING
SIR JOHN MOORE’S CAMPAIGNS.

BY
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ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.

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A R E P L Y,

&c.

THE publication of a second edition furnishes me with an opportunity, of which I avail myself, to answer some attacks which have been made on this history. Anonymous periodical criticisms are to be disregarded,—like wasps, they sting and die ; but elaborate writings, controverting my arguments, and expressly impugning the accuracy of my statements, stand upon a different footing. I speak, however, of English works only, for to maintain my ground against Spanish writers would be endless labour ; and it would be painful to support statements offensive to a nation which I have always respected, even while recording its errors. Sir Hew Dalrymple's excellent Memoirs, published after my second volume had appeared, show that I have in no degree strained my authorities ; and if those authorities are not sufficient, I have no other justification as regards Spain.

The English publications which I propose to notice, are,—

- 1°. Notes on the Campaign of 1808-9 in the North of Portugal. By Colonel Sorrel.
- 2°. Narrative of the Peninsular War. By Major Leith Hay.
- 3°. Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns. By the Author of Cyril Thornton.
- 4°. Strictures upon Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War. Anonymous.
- 5°. Life of the Duke of Wellington. By Major Moyle Sherer.

To this list I would have added my lord Strangford's second Pamphlet, if Mr. Justice Bayley had not already answered it for me.

See Trial
lord
Strangford
v. Young,
editor of
the Sun.

Colonel Sorrel's Notes.—These were, I understand, dictated by sir David Baird, while labouring with a notion that

I, in concert with other authors, aimed to lower his reputation; a design never entertained by me, and not to be discovered in what I have said of that brave officer. But history would indeed be "an old almanac," if, out of respect to persons, errors, having a palpable influence upon great events, were suppressed: in this view only have I written aught against sir D. Baird, and what I have so written I will now justify; yet my own mistakes fairly acknowledge, with the sincere wish that they were fewer.

1°. It is charged, as a fault, that I have said, "*the rear of sir D. Baird's column extended beyond Lugo on the 26th November, 1808.*"

Page 10. The accuracy of this simple fact colonel Sorrel does not deny, but observes, that "the column was well closed up to Astorga by the 29th of November." Nevertheless, sir D. Baird, writing at the time, informs sir John Moore that his troops *could not be concentrated at Astorga until the 4th of December.*

Vide
Moore's
Narrative,
p. 79.

2°. In my work, it is stated, that, previously to his knowing of the fatal battle of Tudela, "*Sir J. Moore proposed, in case 'he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to abandon all communication with Portugal, throw himself into the heart of Spain, and, drawing round him all he could of the Spanish forces, defend the southern provinces, and trust to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce.'*"

Moore's
Narrative,
p. 156.

Colonel Sorrel thinks this "*must be a mistake.*" But that he thinks so without reason, the following extract from sir J. Moore's letter to Mr. Frere will prove. "Had this army been united and ready to act at the time of general Castanos' defeat, much as I think it would have been risking it, yet it was my intention to have marched on Madrid, and to have shared in the fortunes of the Spanish nation. If I could not have sustained myself there, I thought, by placing myself behind the Tagus, I might give the broken armies and the people of Spain, if they had patriotism left, an opportunity to assemble round me, and to march to the relief of the capital. That this was my intention is known to the officers with me, who are in my confidence; it is known also to lord Castlereagh, to whom I had imparted it in one of my late letters."

3°. Colonel Sorrel corrects me for saying that sir D. Baird *retreated to Villa-Franca without orders*. And also Page 27. for saying *stores were destroyed at Astorga*. p. 28.

I admit the first to be an error. Nevertheless, a retrograde movement, without orders from sir J. Moore, was commenced. Crawford's brigade, which had been stationed in front of Astorga, passed that town before the retreat was countermanded; and as for the stores, I can assure colonel Sorrel, that I did myself walk ankle-deep in spirits poured into the streets.

4°. It is hinted that I should have refrained from censuring sir D. Baird for sending an important despatch by p. 51. a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost it. "*It is doubtful, also,*" colonel Sorrel complains, "*whether the expression, 'blameable irregularity,' is applied to the inattention of the general, or the drunkenness of the dragoon.*" The colonel also intimates, that to say sir J. Moore personally directed the movements of sir D. Baird's division in the p. 52. battle of Coruña, is derogatory of that general's reputation.

I cannot admit that stating this last fact injures sir David. A general-in-chief must be somewhere; and where he is, he must direct. But touching the matter of the dragoon, I imputed "*blameable irregularity*" to the general; and the following statement, drawn up at the time by the *aide-de-camp* who carried the despatch in question to sir David, justifies the expression.

"On the night that the rear of the army passed through Villa Franca, and halted at a small village about two leagues and a half from that town, sir J. Moore sent captain George Napier (one of his *aides-de-camp*), about two o'clock in the morning, with despatches for sir D. Baird, enclosing orders to lieutenant-generals Hope and Fraser, the nature of which orders was to prevent lieut.-general Fraser's division proceeding on the road towards Vigo, and to make them halt at Lugo, as sir J. Moore had (owing to many circumstances) altered his intention of proceeding with the army to Vigo. When sir John delivered these despatches to captain Napier, he said, 'Have you a good horse, Napier? you must get to Nogales to sir D. Baird before five o'clock this morning, if possible, as otherwise sir David will have marched, and then you must follow him.' Sir John

also gave Captain N. particular orders to be very careful of the despatches, as they were of the greatest consequence ; and to tell sir David ‘ *to forward those which were enclosed to generals Hope and Fraser as quick as possible.* ’ ”

“ When captain Napier arrived at Nogales, which he did a few minutes after five o’clock, he found sir David in bed, and delivered him *the despatches and orders*. Sir David asked, ‘ If he (captain N.) was to go on with those for generals Hope and Fraser ? ’ ‘ No, sir, unless you have no other person to send ; and, in that case, of course I will proceed ; but I must first get a fresh horse.’ Sir David then said, ‘ Were you ordered by sir J. Moore to proceed with these letters to general Hope ? ’ Captain N. replied, ‘ My orders were to deliver the despatches to you, and you were to forward those for lieut.-generals Hope and Fraser, *with all care and despatch.* ’ On this he said, ‘ Very well ; ’ *and in about two hours after, or perhaps not quite so long,* he sent the despatches off by an orderly dragoon of the 15th regiment. Sir David marched soon afterwards, with his division, to some heights on the road towards Lugo, about two or three short leagues from Nogales ; and towards the evening he came himself back to Nogales, and said to captain Napier, who was waiting there until sir J. Moore should arrive, ‘ *By God, the rascal of a dragoon by whom I sent those despatches this morning, has got drunk and lost them.* ’ Upon which captain N. immediately mounted his horse and went off to report the circumstance to sir J. Moore, whom he met on the hill coming down into Nogales. ‘ *He seemed quite astonished and displeased with sir D. Baird for having sent despatches by an orderly dragoon, which were of such consequence that the commander of the forces thought it necessary to send one of his own aides-de-camp with them.* ’ ”

Two forced marches were thus imposed upon M’Kenzie’s and Fraser’s division, which occasioned great distress and loss ; and here I must observe that I never meant, nor did attribute blame to that general whose conduct was strictly in unison with his orders ; yet I have heard that his friends also were hurt at the mode in which I introduced his name, —perhaps at the lightness of the expression, “ A Pilgrimage ” to St. Jago, which, I admit, is a trifling conceit, unsuitable to the gravity of the occasion.

Narrative of the Peninsular War.—Major Leith Hay is pleased so to term it; but it is only a narrative of his personal adventures during about half the period that war lasted. He seems offended that I should have exposed the foolish conduct of the military agents employed by Government at the commencement of the Spanish insurrection; yet he has not, and could not, disprove my statements, seeing that they are supported by the letters of the agents themselves, and that the public voice has proclaimed their justice. He says, indeed, “*that to include the whole of the agents with exception only of colonel Coxe and lord William Bentinck, in one sweeping and unqualified censure, appears as little worthy of history as it probably will be hereafter considered of notice;*” and that to answer me he has only to mention the names of “*colonels Paisley, Jones, Lefevre, and Birch.*” But I have not included the whole in one sweeping censure; and the last-named officers, whose talents I acknowledge, and one of whom (colonel Birch) I have especially quoted as giving good intelligence, were not agents, but on the staff of an agent. The justice of their views only sets in a more disadvantageous light the errors of general Leith, under whom they acted.

Narrative,
vol. i. p. 18.

Major Leith Hay thinks my observations will be considered unworthy of notice hereafter, but intimates that his work is founded on perfectly authentic documents, meaning, thereby, his own memoranda. Whatever may be the fate of my writings, major Hay's will scarcely serve as guides to posterity, when it is found that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he says, “on the forenoon of the 26th Sept. I was directed to advance in front, with a squadron of Portuguese cavalry, and report the movements of the enemy on the roads close to the right bank of the Mondego, directly communicating with the valley of Larangeira. *In the execution of this service we proceeded two leagues without encountering an enemy.*”—“*As we rode forward a cannonade and fire of musketry was heard in the direction of St. Combadaõ, where the duke of Elchingen and general Reynier were forcing back upon the position the advance of the allied army.*” Now St. Combadaõ is about twenty miles distant from Busaco; the light division and Pack's brigade formed ‘the advance of the army;’ the former never were

Ib. p. 231.

Vide App.
sec. 3.
vol. iii.
Napier's
History.

within ten miles of Combadaõ, and Pack retired from thence, without an action, on the 22d. Moreover, on the 26th, when major Hay heard this firing at Combadaõ, the duke of Elchingen and general Reynier were, and had been from one o'clock of the 25th, immediately in front of Busaco, and their light troops were actually skirmishing with the British in that position, which the major had just left two leagues in his rear! Hence it would appear that this authentic narrative has been compiled from rather bad memoranda.

Strictures upon Colonel Napier's History.—Although anonymous attacks should be disregarded, I notice this pamphlet, written in defence of lord Beresford, because the writer would have it understood, either that he is lord Beresford, or that he writes from his lordship's dictation. I, however, think, that lord Beresford's knowledge would reject the inaccuracy of this work, and that his modesty would shrink from dictating such gross praise of himself. It is not credible, I say, that lord Beresford should describe himself "*As a wise, firm, and conciliatory person*"—" *A man whose qualifications eminently fitted him for high important trusts*"—" *An officer of zeal, temper, discretion, and intelligence*"—" *A distinguished commander capable of the greatest things*"—" *A person evincing a knowledge of mankind, a skill in the various principles by which the human heart is actuated, and a facility in influencing and directing them, ranked amongst the exclusive characteristics of the highest class of mankind.*"

The anonymous author, whoever he be, at first gives me credit for possessing "*very considerable qualities as an historian,*" and expresses his belief that "*my errors are unintentional,*" arising from "*inaccurate information.*" But he says that he answers my statements "*lest a work of such pretensions to consideration should bias posterity.*" Alas for posterity! He fears it will be biassed by "*an adopter and propagator of foolish and trumpery reports*"—" *A person of easy credulity*"—" *Of extraordinary ignorance of facts and of topography*"—" *Writing from exparte and false information*"—" *Presumptuous*"—" *Inexperienced*"—" *A caviller*"—" *A mere soldier of theory, presuming to*



discuss the abilities, the opinions, and the conduct of so able and distinguished an officer as lord Beresford"—" *An historian without literary integrity or fairness*"—" *A special pleader*"—" *An illogical reasoner*"—" *An intrepid assertor*"—" *Excessively deficient in the most essential qualities*"—and one whose "*Intellectual vision is thickly offuscated by the mist of party prejudices.*"

As indications of "galled withers" all this may pass, but in the same vein I am told that I "*know nothing of lord Beresford whatever*"—that I had "*given myself no trouble to enquire into his military services or his personal character*"—" *Did not know when, or where, or how, that distinguished officer had been employed,*"—and with "*a common and most senseless prejudice which is often found in connexion with a certain class of political opinions, took it for granted that because lord Beresford was highly allied, he must necessarily be deficient in professional skill, and because he possessed that family patronage which might bring his merits into notice, it must follow as an inevitable consequence, that he could not be in possession of the merit that might deserve it.*"

Being at least as nobly connected as Lord Beresford, and not likely to draw conclusions against myself, I leave his "high alliances" to those whom they may concern; but his family patronage is more to the purpose, and for his military services I will give some tokens of my enquiries after them. The pamphleteer calls me a "mere soldier of theory," although I have seen many more and harder campaigns than lord Beresford saw, before he attained the command of the Portuguese army; he will therefore, doubtless, permit me to begin with his lordship's expedition to Buenos Ayres, which was his essay as a general-in-chief. I happen to know many curious details of that event, which have been related by eye-witnesses, but it is needless to touch on them now; suffice it to say, that lord Beresford was there completely beaten and laid down his arms.

His next appearance was as commandant of the island of Madeira, which had been secretly delivered up to England in trust, by the prince of Portugal. The Portuguese declare that, in violation of this trust, lord Beresford called upon the authorities to swear allegiance to George III.;

but I will not dwell on that point. He governed the island, well or ill, for some months.

At Coruña he, as I have stated, commanded the brigade covering the embarkation. It proved to be of no great importance, and if a conversation, such as I have heard, did really take place between him and an eminent staff officer, his lordship did not, at the time, rate the honor so high as his defender does now.

These indications that I am not entirely ignorant of lord Beresford's services, *before* he commanded the Portuguese forces, are only given in answer to the writer of this pamphlet. I have no desire to enlarge upon them; and for my knowledge of his services *after* he attained that command, let my work vouch. I may have seen them with a jaundiced eye. I may have been "*incapable from the circumstances of my military life, to form an adequate conception of the difficulties which the general of large corps has to contend with.*" I may have had my "*intellectual vision offuscated by the mists of party prejudice;*" but my opinion is still that marshal Beresford was not "*a distinguished commander,*"—not an "*enterprising general,*"—not "*capable of the greatest things.*" If I am wrong, his deeds are before the world to obviate my conclusions. Great actions cannot be smothered with ink. Here, however, I must observe, that the author of this pamphlet is unjustifiable in saying that I have "*hinted at professional backwardness.*" That would have been a gratuitous insult, whereas I have strictly confined myself to my undoubted right of measuring marshal Beresford's military capacity by the standard of his exploits; neither will it serve to cry out—political prejudice! because I have nowhere attacked lord Wellington, lord Hill, lord Lynedoch, lord Stuart de Rothesay, sir Edward Paget, and others whose political opinions were the same as lord Beresford's. These preliminary remarks made, I proceed to examine my opponent's arguments.

I. In relating the manner of lord Beresford's appointment to the command of the Portuguese army, I used the following terms:—"The Portuguese Regency, whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation, had offered the command of all the native troops to an

English general, with power to alter and amend the military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command of regiments, and to act without control in any measure he should judge fitting, to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese army."

"It is said, that sir J. Doyle, sir J. Murray, general Beresford, and even the Marquis of Hastings, then Earl of Moira, sought for the appointment. The last was undoubtedly a man well fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents, both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an office; but powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, major-general Beresford was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior rank, who were displeased that a man, without any visible claim to superiority, should be placed over their heads."

"*This short extract*," says the pamphleteer, "*contains as many fallacies as lines.*" "*It would be difficult, perhaps, to find in any other historian a passage equally short, and equally abounding in mistatements and mistakes.*" He then proceeds to show that marshal Beresford *never applied for the appointment*; doubts if any of the other officers named did so; is indignant that it should be supposed *parliamentary interest* had any influence in the matter; and taking advantage of a piece of bad composition, endeavours to convict me of "*arguing upon a rumour as if it were a certainty, with a view to draw an unfair conclusion against lord Beresford.*"

Rigorously speaking, he is entitled to prefer this last charge, because the remark upon lord Moira's qualifications separates the members of my sentence in a slovenly manner; but take that away, or put it in a parenthesis, and the whole passage will (as it was intended) rest on the rumour. This writer, indeed, rebukes me for noticing rumours; but the fact being interesting, and probable, why should I have suppressed it? And what are the mistatements? What the fallacies of which I am accused?

1°. *Marshal Beresford never asked for the office, and therefore parliamentary interest could have had nothing to do with the affair.*

It is, however, the essential business of a government, conducted on a system of patronage, to solicit men of pow-

erful families to accept great offices; and who more powerful than the Beresfords? This system is now declared to be on its death-bed, but was it in its infancy in 1809?

2°. *The Portuguese Regency never offered lord Beresford full power.*

I confess my error here, and will explain how it arose. In lord Castlereagh's instructions to Sir J. Cradock, I found that the Regency had applied for an "English general to *organize and command their army.*" Lastly, I knew that twelve days after lord Beresford arrived at Lisbon, he did in fact exercise a complete control over the Portuguese army. It appears, however, that those twelve days were devoted to the most difficult negotiations; that the marshal and Mr. Villiers had "*a world of difficulties*" to obtain the necessary powers, and that they were '*most reluctantly conceded to the determined representations of the British Minister.*' But of those negotiations I found no trace in lord Castlereagh's despatches, nor in lord Wellington's letter, nor in sir J. Cradock's correspondence; hence my error, insignificant in itself, was very difficult to avoid: nevertheless I stated the fact with some doubt of its accuracy, as the expression "*whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation*" sufficiently proves. This is the only real foundation for the abuse so liberally bestowed.

But I will show that this writer has greatly exaggerated the difficulty of the negotiations, and when he states that one of marshal Beresford's qualifications for the command, was his being "*perfectly conversant with the language of the people,*" he states that which a better authority than he can be contradicts.

Extract of a letter from marshal Beresford to Lord Wellington, Chamusca, 4th Jan. 1811.

"On lord Castlereagh's communicating to me his Majesty's pleasure that I should proceed to Portugal, to fill the situation I now hold, it was my duty to point out to his lordship what my experience in the country had made me think absolutely necessary to fulfil, with any prospect of advantage, the views of his Majesty, and of his royal highness the Prince Regent, in giving to a British general the command of the Portuguese army; and, amongst other things, I represented it as necessary that in all things re-

specting the organization and discipline of the army, the commander-in-chief should be perfectly independent of the government, and that it was absolutely necessary rewards and punishments should be exclusively with him. These claims lord Castlereagh told me Mr. Canning would give directions to his Majesty's envoy here to stipulate for, and that I need not undertake the task until they were granted. I consequently, on my arrival, declined accepting the command on waiting on the Regency, till Mr. Villiers should have made these necessary stipulations, and in consequence of which, *after he had some conference with the Regency*, I put down, at his desire, in English, something to the purport (for it appears a very bad translation or ill copied) of the propositions, in one of the papers enclosed, and to which the answer annexed to it was given. *I was not then very much master of the Portuguese*, but I recollect observing to Mr. Villiers that the answer appeared to me ambiguous, and wishing further explanation. He, however, assured me that it was quite proper, and that the *government intended fully to accede to my desires*, and to support me fully in every thing, and I remained with the understanding that, though for the dignity of the government it might desire particular forms, that virtually the power in every thing respecting the formation, organization, and discipline of the army remained with me; and on this principle I have ever since acted, with the full acquiescence and sanction of government."

Here we find no reluctance and no difficulty, except that which the marshal, from his imperfect knowledge of the language, experienced in trying to read the answer of the Regency.

3°. The pamphleteer says, *That although many officers, at a later period, wanted lord Beresford's situation, none were discontented at the time; and only sir J. Murray objected to the local rank of lieutenant-general, which accompanied it.*

But this local rank was a necessary adjunct to the command of the Portuguese troops, and any discontent occasioned thereby was a discontent at lord Beresford's appointment. Sir J. Murray's displeasure is admitted; and the following letter from general Sherbroke to sir John Cradock, speaks for itself:—

"Lisbon, March 12.

Sir John
Cradock's
Corre-
spondence,
MS.

"Sir,—Hearing, upon my landing here this day, that his Majesty has been pleased to confer upon major-general Beresford the local rank of lieutenant-general in Portugal, I wish to submit to your excellency that I am three years a senior major-general in the British army; and although I shall, under the present circumstances, perform, with the greatest cheerfulness, the duties which you may require of me, yet I think, on reference to the customs of the service, you will see my present situation in such a point of view as shall induce your excellency to lay my humble request before his royal highness the commander-in-chief, that he will be graciously pleased to move his Majesty to confer on me the local rank of lieutenant-general also, while serving in this country."

Thus it appears that the discontent, even at the moment, was, not as this author "*positively asserts*," confined to sir John Murray, and though he also labours hard to show, that lord Beresford's superior claims were at that time "*very visible to any person whose intellectual eye was not blinded by prejudice*," I confess I have yet to learn that, in the opinion of the army, his lordship's merits, though they should even be enhanced by his share of the glory of Albuera, were greater than general Sherbrooke's.

II. The writer expresses his indignation at my saying, that lord Beresford could never have overcome the difficulties of his situation if he had not been "*directed, sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under whom he worked*."

Whether in this I am correct, or otherwise, will be made manifest in the course of my work; but this author discovers an irritable hastiness in commenting upon the expression; he supposes it applied wholly to the difficulties of discipline, whereas, it evidently refers to political obstacles. I will, however, go farther, and say, that even the discipline of the troops was not more indebted to lord Beresford's than it was to the zeal and knowledge of the excellent English officers who served under him. Madden, Harvey, Ashworth, Elder, Oliver, Douglas, and others like them, were the spirits animating the system that raised the Portuguese troops so high in the scale of European armies;

and these officers were not instructed by marshal Beresford—some of them were capable of instructing him.

III. The pamphleteer denies the truth of the following passage :—" *In time almost all the military situations of emolument and importance were held by Englishmen.*" History,
p. 154.

The word emolument is used in its simple sense. The nation was at war for its existence, the whole population in arms, the country lately ravaged by an enemy, and the treasury quite empty. In such a crisis all military situations were more or less places of "*emolument and importance*," it being borne in mind that England paid the greatest part of the army. Now as to the facts. Lord Wellington, admiral Berkeley, and Mr. Stuart, were members of the Regency. The first was also captain-general of all the Portuguese forces, regular or irregular;—that is to say, of the whole population able to bear arms. The second was admiral of all the fleet on the European waters. Marshal Beresford commanded all the regular land armies. Sir Thomas Hardy was commandant of the port and arsenal of Lisbon, and to these places salaries were attached. Lord Wellington, indeed, gave his Portuguese, as he also did his Spanish, pay to the military chest; but this was a private act of disinterestedness, and I believe his example was not followed. Here, then, were places of "*emolument and importance*" filled by Englishmen.

Let us proceed.

Colonel Trant was governor of Oporto; colonel Cox, governor of Almeida; colonel Austen, of Algarve; general Blunt, of Peniché. Sir Robert Wilson commanded the Lusitanian Legion; Trant, John Wilson, and Miller, were also at the head of different brigades of militia, and ordnance; colonel Grant and major Fenwick commanded smaller bodies of the same species of troops; colonel D'Urban, colonel John Campbell, and colonel Madden, had high commands in the cavalry; generals Hamilton, Spry, Harvey, Pack, Ashworth, and Collins, commanded divisions or brigades of the regular infantry; others held commands in the artillery; Hardinge, Arbuthnot, Warre, &c., were on the staff; and almost all the regiments of the line were commanded by Englishmen, or had English majors, captains, and subalterns; nor were these names, which readily

occur to me, the whole. Situations of importance were held by Englishmen without any particular title: thus a British engineer, especially appointed, had a voice in the council of war at Abrantes, so potential that the governor could make no capitulation without his consent. No doubt these appointments were requisite and necessary—I never said or thought otherwise; but neither is there a doubt that they hurt the national pride of the Portuguese, and this was clearly shown when the crisis of danger passed away.

IV. I come now to the most elaborate portion of this pamphlet, where the writer endeavours at once to uphold the superior ability of marshal Beresford in a discussion with sir John Cradock on a military movement, and to expose the partiality and hollowness of my observations in a contrary sense.

Page 27. The argument is thus commenced. "*It is difficult to understand why the consideration of this difference between two general officers, from which colonel Napier intimates, though I think erroneously, that no results ensued, should occupy so large a space in his history.*"

I have intimated nothing of the kind, and the difficulty is removed by my opponent himself, because, in the same page, he says, "*It must be owned that the subject is in itself a fair theme of historical discussion.*"

Proceeding in the same vein, the writer affirms that I "*sought for and procured all the arguments on one side, and never took the trouble to inquire for any on the other.*"

Page 33. Subsequently he says, "*with the aid of these four documents, I shall, I think, be enabled to set aside the arguments of the historian, and, consequently, overthrow the conclusion he has founded upon them.*"

But these "*four documents*" are extracted from my history, and two of them are letters of sir John Cradock and marshal Beresford discussing the very movement in question! They were printed at full length in my appendix; the substance of each fairly given in the body of the work; they tell their own story, and the only help given by me to sir John Cradock's view of the matter is, an opinion that marshal Beresford's proposition was, for certain stated reasons, "unsound." How, then, can this writer venture to assert that I "*sought for and procured only the arguments*

on one side," and that I have, on this occasion, "*descended from the seat of calm and impartial judgment, to exercise my powers of special pleading in favour of the views of one party?*"

The point of dispute between the two generals was, whether the allied army should *move to the succour of Oporto*; or *remain near Lisbon?* and I condemned Beresford's arguments in favour of the first plan, partly because Cradock's appeared to me conclusive against its propriety, and partly because of my after acquired knowledge of the real state of affairs. The writer of this pamphlet, changing the proposition, asserts, that I censured Beresford for proposing a *march to Leiria*, although my observations were plainly and expressly directed against a *march to Oporto*. The best mode of proceeding, however, is to place that which I did say, together with my authority, before the reader, praying him to remark the words in italics.

History, vol. ii. page 153.—"While thus engaged, intelligence arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Silveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto; and that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo. The Junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the Regency; and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop's party, proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and march to the *succour of Oporto*. Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command among the mutinous multitudes in that city; but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to follow this plan." Again, at page 157.—"Marshal Beresford's plan, founded on the supposition, that Cradock could engage Soult *at Oporto*, and yet quit him, and return at his pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on

positive data : it was conjectural that they could *relieve Oporto*, it was positive that they would endanger Lisbon."

Authorities. 1°. Extracts from marshal Beresford's letter to sir John Cradock, 29th March, 1809 :—

" Upon the subject of marching a British force *to Oporto* under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency's consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leiria, to be thence pushed on *to Oporto*, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was, that as there appeared an intention of co-operation (*of which, however, there is no certainty*) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one, before the other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able to do this, would be merely a matter of calculation of time ; as, supposing on our arrival at Leiria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army pushing from Leiria to Oporto without apprehension from the army of Victor."—" It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of *this movement towards Oporto*."

2°. Extracts from sir John Cradock's reply to the above. 29th March, 1809.

" I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your excellency's letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British troops to the *succour of Oporto*," &c.—
" To venture upon an advance *to Oporto*, two hundred miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding. If the British army sets out with the declared object to *succour Oporto*, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same. Nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character!"

These extracts show that the author of the pamphlet is not justified in asserting that I "completely misunderstood the nature of marshal Beresford's views and intentions; that I have injuriously treated that distinguished officer, and that I have strangely perverted his meaning by making him say it was doubtful whether Victor and Soult intended to 'co-operate on a single plan'"—above all, it is most disingenuous, first to assume that I objected to a march upon Leiria, and then to argue upon the misrepresentation in the following manner:—

"*This same military movement cannot be both right and wrong, politic and impolitic, correct and erroneous.*"—"If the proposal of advancing the army to Leiria was evidently unsound when suggested by marshal Beresford, the movement itself ought, in impartial justice, to have been condemned by the historian as at least equally unsound when put in execution by sir John Cradock." Page 35.

But in what manner was it the same military movement? Every circumstance was different.—1°. It was a movement to Leiria—not to Oporto. 2°. It took place ten or twelve days later, during which time 5000 British infantry, and 300 artillery horses, had reinforced Cradock's army; and a regiment of dragoons was hourly expected. "*Since the present accession of strength,*" says Sir J. Cradock, "*it may be advisable to make a short movement in advance as far as Leiria.*" 3°. Victor, instead of threatening Portugal, as the reports of the 26th March had represented him to be doing, had engaged himself with Cuesta, and had just fought the battle of Medellin; moreover, a march to Leiria only did not open Lisbon to that marshal. 4°. Lapisse, instead of joining Soult, was moving towards the Tagus by the passes of the Gredos; and thus, while the enemy were weakened by a diversity of plans, the allies were become infinitely stronger. But what, in fact, can be more absurd than this writer's notion that the same military movements must be equally good at one time as at another? and, after all, Cradock's march to Leiria was made entirely at the request of lord Beresford. "*I consented to general Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance, as he said it would give confidence to the body of Portuguese troops assembled at Thomar, and enable him to un-*"

Sir John
Cradock to
General
Richard
Stewart,
5th April,
1809.

dertake the defence of the bridge and station at Abrantes.”
—Sir John Cradock to general Richard Stewart, April 8, 1808.

The author, having made this use of the march to Leiria, changes his ground to magnify lord Beresford's military genius in recommending a march to Oporto.

“*It appears,*” he says, “*from the evidence afforded by colonel Napier himself, that lord Beresford had exactly divined the intention of the enemy—nay, that he had anticipated the very orders of Buonaparte, in which the three corps of Soult, Victor, and Lapisse, are directed to co-operate—and yet his reasoning, the wisdom of which is proved by facts and by the documents recorded in the author's own volume, is condemned.*” “*Colonel Napier, forsooth, with a very superficial knowledge of the circumstances of the time, and scarcely any of the localities, has the presumption to record that those views are evidently unsound.*”

Hard words these, if founded in reason; if otherwise, foolish words. Let us examine their value. Three invading corps were hanging on the frontier: “*there appeared,*” says lord Beresford, “*an intention of co-operation.*” Here was no great divination; moreover other things were divined, such as the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which did not happen. Let that pass. The preservation of Lisbon was the primary object of the allies. Beresford proposed that their combined forces should march against one of the three invading corps, and he was bound to show,—1° That while thus operating against one enemy, another could not take possession of Lisbon. 2°. That there should be some prospect of beating that body which the allies intended to fight. Were either of these things reasonably secure?

Victor, rated 35,000 strong, and having just defeated Cuesta, was at Merida and Caceres, the head of his columns reported to be pointing towards Portugal. Was the safety of Lisbon cared for in a plan to march all the allied forces against Soult, who was two hundred miles from that capital, when Victor, a more powerful enemy, was thus threatening it from a nearer point?

The author of this pamphlet says yes, because “*Victor had no means of crossing the Tagus; he had with him neither pontoon nor bridge equipage of any kind, and the river*

See his letter to Sir John Cradock—Appendix.

from the frontier of Portugal was rolling down, as is always the case at this season of the year, a rapid, heavy, mighty, unfordable mass of water."

Indeed! What, then, is the meaning of the following extract from admiral Berkeley's correspondence with sir John Cradock, April 6th, 1809?—"There is a circumstance upon which, if both yourself and general Beresford are absent from Lisbon, it may be necessary that some decisive knowledge should be obtained—I mean *the boats and craft upon the Tagus*, the disposal of which seems to be confided to the commissary-general. That gentleman, I suppose, will naturally attend the army, and, of course, if we should suddenly require them, or if the enemy made a rapid movement across the Alemtejo, *he might become master of the boats* before an express could reach the commissary-general to remove them." What also is the meaning of the following passages in sir John Cradock's despatches to lord Castlereagh, 12th April, 1809.—"There is *a ferry* at Salvatierra, near Alcantara, and *another* up the left bank of the Tagus, in the Alemtejo, where there is also a *ford*, and *the river may be easily passed*."

The admiral and general, however, soon discovered, that the control of the craft was not in the commissary-general's hands, but in those of the regency, and that the latter had "*made no register of the boats*," and that, in fact, "*nothing useful was done, or likely to be done, in the matter*." Thus it seems that Victor need not have been stopped by the Tagus, and that there was no security for Lisbon during the march of the army to Oporto.

We now come to the second object,—namely, the chance of success against Soult. That general had more than 20,000 men, comprising a great body of excellent cavalry. Could 12,000 British infantry, without cavalry, with scarcely any artillery, and unprovided with means of transport,—could they, although assisted, or rather embarrassed, by an ill-disciplined native force, have brought the French general to action and beaten him?—or if they had, could they have rendered their victory so decisive as to leave him and return in time to cover Lisbon? and was Lapisse, who had 12,000 men and 30 guns, to remain a passive spectator of such

operations ?—could he not have joined Soult, or have marched upon Coimbra, in rear of the allied forces ?

It is intimated, by the writer of this pamphlet, that lord Wellington did thus march upon Oporto, and defeat Soult ; but that happened five weeks later, and when the intentions of the English cabinet were no longer doubtful. It happened when, partly by the exertions of marshal Beresford, partly by the effect of the fall of Oporto, but chiefly by the reputation of lord Wellington, the Portuguese troops, from a "*lawless mob*,"—I use the writer's own expression,—"*were become an orderly force*." It happened also when the allied army was increased by at least 7000 English infantry, four regiments of cavalry, horses for the artillery, money and commissary stores from England, and when more troops were on the voyage to Lisbon. It happened when Cradock's efforts, followed up by lord Wellington's, had procured supplies for the movement ; when Lapisse had passed into Lower Estremadura, and by this false march had marred the French combinations, placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether regular troops or auxiliaries, between Soult and Victor, so that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between them. It happened also when Victor, whose troops were suffering dreadfully from the Guadiana fever, was known to be forming an entrenched camp at Medellin, instead of moving on Portugal. It happened when Cuesta, who was again at the head of more numerous forces than before, had promised to follow Victor closely in any march towards Portugal ; when, also, intercepted letters of king Joseph's indicated that Seville, not Portugal, was Victor's object ; when Venegas was threatening La Mancha with a fresh army ; and when Soult, after having lost time at Amarante, and men at Chaves, had spread his troops over a wide extent of country ; when his offensive strength was exhausted, and when there was a powerful conspiracy in his camp, the leaders of which were in communication with the English general ; and when, to crown all, the real numbers of the French being unknown, were underrated. Notwithstanding all this, the operation would have failed of any great result, had it not been for the astonishing passage of the Douro, an action not to be expected from ordinary generals.

Let us also observe the difference of the measures taken to secure the Tagus. Beresford wanted Cradock *to move at once with the whole allied force*, depending only on some calculations of time; but when lord Wellington moved, the false march of Lapisse had enabled him to draw down the Lusitanian legion, and the militia of the Beira frontier to defend the bridge of Alcantara, which was mined. Three British battalions were also drafted from the army at Leiria; to these were added two other British battalions, and two regiments of cavalry, just landed at Lisbon; and finally, 8000 Portuguese regulars, forming altogether an army which, placed under one general, could defend the line of the Tagus from Abrantes to Lisbon. An additional corps of observation was also formed from the garrisons of Badajos and Elvas, to watch the movements of Victor on the Guadiana; and finally, the seamen and marines, and the civic legions of Lisbon, formed a body of reserve. Hence it was that I said lord Wellington's plans were "neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward." He made, indeed, a daring movement, but it was the daring of a great general; whereas marshal Beresford only proposed a rash march of two hundred miles to succour a place which had actually fallen the very day on which he made the proposal. Nor is this all. Beresford proposed to march with the Portuguese and British troops combined, and the pamphleteer says, that "the allied force would have been *in every respect superior to Soult's whole army*." Now this movement was proposed the 29th of March, the British had two hundred miles to move; wherefore, allowing two days for preparations and unforeseen obstacles, the allies would have been in front of Soult about the 9th of April. Let us see then what, at that period, was marshal Beresford's own description of the Portuguese portion of this army, so "*superior in every respect*" to the enemy,—this force, which was not only to manœuvre before, but to drive Soult, with his veteran infantry and powerful cavalry, out of the kingdom.

"I this morning met no less than three expresses, communicating to me the *horrible state of mutiny*—for I can call it no less—in which the *troops everywhere are*, and the *inhabitants are in equal insubordination, and they encourage each other*." And what says sir J. Cradock?—

Page 59.

M. Beresford to sir J. Cradock. Santarem, April 7, 1809.

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castle-reagh.
April 3.

“No reliance whatever can be placed on the Portuguese troops. *If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford's sentiments.*”

But why prolong this examination, when the broad facts that Beresford could not control the Portuguese troops, and that Cradock could not procure equipments or supplies for the British, are proved by the letters of those generals themselves? Cradock's difficulties, the pamphleteer says, could not have been known to marshal Beresford at the moment of his suggesting his plan; be it so; his proposition, then, was founded in utter ignorance of the real state of affairs, and therefore “*evidently unsound.*”

V. Of the points which I have enumerated as marking the difference between marshal Beresford's proposal and sir Arthur Wellesley's operation, the following have been either denied, doubted, or ridiculed, by the writer of this pamphlet. 1°. *Cuesta's promise to wait on Victor's movements.* 2°. *The amount of Cuesta's force.* 3°. *That the conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies when sir Arthur Wellesley decided to march against that general.* 4°. *That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c. &c. was, by the false march of Lapisse, placed between Victor and Soult.* 5°. *That Abrantes was a fortress.* 6°. *That Soult's offensive was exhausted.* 7°. *That the intention of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.*

1°. *Cuesta's promise.* *Authority.*—Mr. FRERE to Sir JOHN CRADOCK.

Seville, 21st April, 1809.

“If general Victor should evacuate the country which he now occupies, and undertake a march to the relief of marshal Soult, general Cuesta would advance in proportion, and endeavour to harass and detain him, as far as possible, without risking a general action. This latter part I consider as agreed.”

There was a direct communication between Seville and Lisbon, and this letter reached sir A. Wellesley either the 24th or 25th of April.

2°. *Amount of Cuesta's force.*—This was rated by me at 35,000 in the gross, and 25,000 actually in his camp.

Authorities.—Sir A. WELLESLEY to Lord CASTLEREAGH.

April 24, 1809.

“ CUESTA is at Llerena collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, a part of them good troops.”

Mr. FRERE to Sir A. WELLESLEY.

Seville, 4th May.

“ WE have here 3000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of Estremadura.” “ General Cuesta has with him 4000 cavalry.”

In addition to this, recruits were daily arriving in his camp, and he had several partizan detachments. Thus it appears I have underrated the actual force immediately in front of Victor.

3°. *The conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies when sir Arthur Wellesley, &c. &c.*

This is proved by the following facts, drawn from the original narrative of one of the parties concerned. John Viana, the agent of the conspirators, reached Thomar in the middle of April; and, in consequence of his information, an English field-officer was sent to Aveiro to meet D'Argenton, the principal conspirator. He did so, and then returned with the letter to Lisbon, whither Beresford had meanwhile repaired to meet sir Arthur Wellesley. It is evident, therefore, that marshal Beresford knew of the conspiracy before sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival at Lisbon, and consequently the latter knew it when he planned his operations.

4°. *That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c. &c.*

When Victor was on the upper Guadiana, Soult was on the Douro; their most direct line of communication was by Alcantara, and coasting the Beira frontier. As long as Lapisse protected this line with a strong corps, their operations were connected; but when that general joined Victor on the Guadiana, nearly all the central parts of Portugal and the allied armies were between the latter and Soult. The frontier line of Portugal, also, and the part of Spain adjoining it, immediately became insurgent, and the partizan corps before employed to watch Lapisse, were then placed to guard the bridge of Alcantara. My expressions are therefore strictly correct.

5°. *Abrantes*.—The pamphleteer says, “*there was not the vestige of a fortification*” at this place in May, 1809.

Authority.—In my notes taken from major Patton’s original report, which is dated 12th April, 1809, I find that that officer, who had been employed to examine and strengthen Abrantes, describes the castle as commanding all around it, and secure from an escalade; that there was a garrison of 4000 men in the town; and that it would require 6000 when completely fortified. The fortifications, which were afterwards carried to a great extent, were then commenced; and hence, in the beginning of May, the place was undoubtedly in such a state as to justify my expression that “Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance.”

6°. *Soult’s offensive was exhausted*. This the writer of the pamphlet says was not more visible in May than in March. Now in March, Soult was in one compact mass, bearing down upon Oporto with the avowed intention of afterwards marching to Lisbon, having assurance from the emperor that Victor and Lapisse were co-operating. But in May, Lapisse had abandoned all co-operation; so had Victor; and both were cut off from any direct communication with Soult. The latter had remained five weeks inactive in Oporto, his troops were scattered, and he had shown, by feeling towards his left in force, that his views were no longer fixed upon Lisbon. It was therefore much more visible. Finally, sir A. Wellesley judged it so, for in a letter to Mr. Frere, 24th April, he says, “they (the French) have not passed the Vouga to the south, nor have they extended themselves into Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, but they have made some movement towards the Tamega, which divides Tras os Montes from Minho; and it is supposed they intend to acquire for themselves the option of retreating into Spain.” “It is probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego.”

7°. *That the intentions of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful*.

Authorities.—Extracts from Sir JOHN CRADOCK’s Correspondence, 1809.

January 19.—“We are determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of receiving orders from England.”

February 9th.—"The orders we daily expect may be either for immediate embarkation, or to maintain Portugal." "We have but this one wish, to act for the credit of our country, and endeavour, under the want of all information, to discover what may be the object of the government we serve."

February 26th.—"Since the 14th of January we are without instructions from England."

Extract of a despatch from Mr. CANNING to Mr. FRERE.

April 11th.—"You will observe that in the alternative for which it is necessary to provide (though I trust nevertheless it is not likely to take place), of the evacuation of Portugal by his Majesty's forces, sir A. Wellesley is directed to proceed with the army to Cadiz, to be landed there on the acceptance, by the Spanish government, of the condition *which you have already been instructed to propose*, of the admission of British troops," &c. &c. Other proofs also exist, but it is ridiculous to deny a fact which is continually complained of in sir John Cradock's correspondence; and I have neither space nor inclination to unravel all the tedious confusion of this author's arguments. Having shown that he is inconsistent, and without offence be it said, not very scrupulous in misrepresenting my statements, I proceed to point out his errors as to facts.

Page 40.—The writer asserts that "*there is no other possible route from Portugal to Madrid than by the valley of the Tagus.*"

Answer.—In 1812 lord Wellington moved from the Beira frontier, through the pass of Guadarama to Madrid, *without touching on the valley of the Tagus.* In the same year lord Hill moving from Alemtejo, passed through Lower Estremadura, entered La Mancha, and arrived at Madrid *without touching on the valley of the Tagus.*

Page 43.—He says, "*It is demanded, and with great apparent emphasis, by Colonel Napier, was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto?*"

Answer.—This question is not put at all as from myself; it is a part of the summary of sir John Cradock's arguments.

Page 45.—“ *He (Colonel Napier) conceives that marshal Victor could pass the Tagus at any point, from its source to its mouth.*” “ *Indeed he appears to assert this as a fact.*”

Answer.—I profess never to have conceived this ; neither have I anywhere asserted it. I have, indeed, called the Tagus “ *a river fordable in almost all seasons.*” The pamphleteer says, “ it exhibits a very culpable disregard of accuracy and precision, in any military man, to speak thus generally of a river of such extent ;” and I have the utmost respect for the Tagus, but in an elaborate manuscript memoir on the defence of Portugal, drawn up by Dumouriez, that general, arguing like this writer, on the assumption that *the Tagus is a strong barrier*, says, “ even if Alemtejo and Algarve fell into the hands of the enemy, it would not decide the war, which would become more dangerous for him, because all the means would be united in the four northern provinces.” Against this passage lord Wellington has written the following marginal note :—“ *He does not seem to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season.*”

My expression was, however, a general one. It is not found in reference to the dispute between Cradock and Beresford, but in another part of my work ; and as this writer has been at the pains to search for it, let us see how accurate his own assertions with reference to this river are.

At page 47 he says that I “ err most widely in supposing that river has any ford *in any place*, except during *the very height of summer*. From the time of the first rains, which fall towards the latter end of September to the month of June, it would be a very rare occurrence to find a ford below Abrantes, or indeed within the frontier of Portugal.”

Now the following is an extract from a memoir upon the defence of Portugal, addressed to admiral Berkeley by lord Wellington, 26th October, 1809. “ From what I have above stated, you will observe that in the event of an attack being made within the *months of June and November*, when *the Tagus is fordable*, the operations of the army would be carried on in a part of the country which would be cut off from Peniché,” &c. &c.

Here we have it fordable for six months, and November is

certainly not *the very height of summer*. Further on we shall find that even this fell short of the fact, and that there are fords at other periods also.

Page 48.—The author, continuing his reprimand, says, “the Tagus *could not be forded by Victor*.”

Answer.—The question is not whether he could ford, but whether he could pass it; but even as to fording this writer is not accurate, as the extract from sir John Cradock's letter to lord Castlereagh, dated 12th April, before quoted, proves.

Page 49.—It is asked, “*Supposing marshal Victor had, as colonel Napier points out, marched to Almada, what result would have ensued?*”

Answer.—The advance to Oporto would have been changed to a retreat; but, in fact, I have nowhere pointed out such a march for marshal Victor.

Pages 50 and 51.—“*The historian recommends Saccavem and Lumiar as advantageous and proper posts for the defence of Lisbon.*”

“*Place the British army at Saccavem und Lumiar, and the enemy could, without difficulty, turn it by Loures and Bemfica.*”

Answer.—It is again sir John Cradock, and not the historian, who recommends those positions; neither are they, as this writer would have it believed, spoken of at all as fields of battle, but as positions on which to concentrate the whole allied forces, with a view of covering Lisbon. It is idle to object that they might be turned. Where is the position that may not be turned? The thing to look to in such a case is, whether the army, in position, can by shorter routes intercept the march of the enemy, and offer battle again. In this view the French engineer, St. Vincent, after a careful examination, recommended those posts to Junot, and in this view only sir John Cradock decided to occupy them. “I shall,” he writes to lord Castlereagh, “collect the British force on the heights of Lumiar, my cavalry and light troops at the passes of Monte Cabeços and Bucellar, and a supporting corps at Bucellar. From this station at Lumiar *I can move in any direction where the enemy can present himself.*”

Page 52.—The pamphleteer says, “*He has shown,*

and he trusts to the satisfaction of the reader, that the position, so much recommended in the History of the Peninsular War was improper in every point of view; that looking to the position of the enemy's corps, neither Lisbon nor its environs could be considered as affording a central but, on the contrary, a very retired position."

Answer.—The posts alluded to, namely, Saccavem and Lumiar, were neither commended nor discommended by me; nor are they anywhere expressly called a central position. I say, "sir John Cradock resolved to preserve his central position, covering the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being cut off by one army, while he was engaged with another." This evidently refers, not to one, but to any place suiting that plan of action. Again, I remark, "it must not be objected to sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand with the enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march on his flank."

Cradock's position, however, being at Lumiar, I affirm that, in regard to Lisbon, and the expected advance of the enemy, it was a central position. For Victor and Soult, marching direct upon Lisbon, could not have formed a junction, without giving sir John Cradock an opportunity of pushing between them, and fighting either separately. And here, as this writer makes himself merry with what he calls my central position, I will take the trouble to inform him that, in a military sense, a central position is one from which a general can, when opposed by two adversaries, acting on different lines of operations, prevent his opponents from uniting except by circuitous marches; wherefore it may be central, and at the same time retired. Napoleon's position at the siege of Mantua was central, and yet so retired, that his opponents were close upon Mantua ere he could fight them.

Page 63.—*Lord Beresford departed from Lisbon, on the 8th of April, leaving sir John Cradock still opposed to his views of marching to Leiria.*

Answer.—"I consented to general Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance."—*Letter from sir John Cradock, to general R. Stewart, 8th of April.*

Page 76.—“*But where are these mountains which colonel Napier has placed between Oporto and Lisbon?*”

Answer.—Between Oporto and Lisbon!

They have various names—there is the Sierra de Caradoura, Sierra de Busaco, Monte Junta, and the mountains of Torres Vedras, Mafra, and Montechique, &c. on which lord Wellington’s famous lines were established in 1810. I am surprised this writer has never heard of these last.

At page 77, the pamphleteer says, that although I have mentioned many reasons, I have failed to mention the real and substantial one why lord Wellington moved against Soult instead of Victor, namely—that “*Lisbon would have been left open to the former general.*”

Answer.—The reasons given by me were,—

1°. That sir Arthur Wellesley preferred attacking Soult, because *he held a rich province, and Oporto, the second city of Portugal, which both regent and people desired to recover.*

2°. That, to attack Victor, it was requisite to combine operations with Cuesta, which required time, *that might be employed against Soult.*

Authorities.—Sir A. Wellesley’s correspondence :—

“I should prefer an attack upon Victor in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of *a fertile province of the kingdom, and of the favourite town of Oporto;*” —“and if any operation against Victor, connected with Cuesta’s movements, did not require time to concert it, *which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult.*”

“An operation against Victor is attended by those advantages,—if successful, *it relieves effectually Seville and Lisbon, and it,*” &c. &c.

Thus the “*substantial reason*” falls to the ground. Sir Arthur does not mention it; and if he thought a movement against Victor would *effectually relieve Lisbon*, he could have had no fear of Soult.

Page 78.—The pamphleteer “*is at a loss to see how their (Soult’s and Victor’s) operations could have been carried on by the Zezere.*”

Answer.—My expression was not “*carry on,*” but “*connect, their operations,*” and the Zezere is only mentioned by me to indicate the line of country by which Soult and Victor,

after respectively reaching the Mondego and the Tagus, could best communicate, or, if necessary, form a junction,—and why not? If two armies make a flank march to effect a junction, the covering their movement by a river is an obvious advantage, not only as it protects the march itself, but as it renders the junction militarily secure, long before the troops actually meet, inasmuch as their opponents cannot with safety pass the river to prevent it.

Pages 93, 94, contain a laboured rebuke, for, that I have called small bodies of troops "*corps*."

Answer.—It may be that "*corps*" is a barbarism, but it is found in Johnson's Dictionary, and there defined, "*a body of soldiers*."

Page 101.—It is asserted that on Soult's retreat from Oporto, Silveira, in disobedience of the most positive orders, "*never turned his troops on the Mondin road or towards Salamonde*," and that early on the 15th "*lord Beresford, leaving Amarante on his way to Chaves, overtook general Silveira's division*."

Answer.—These assertions have little reference to anything I have said, but they are meant to explain that "*failure in marshal Beresford's operations*" to which the French owed their safety. I will not contradict them, but it is certain Silveira always affirmed that *his division did march on the 14th to Mondin, and thence through Cavez to Ginzo, where he took thirty prisoners on the 15th, and where his farther progress was arrested by unexpected orders from marshal Beresford's head-quarters*. He also said that the troops lord Beresford overtook, as above stated, were not his, but *Baccellar's Beira Division*, which, at that time, was only an auxiliary. I have, therefore, in nowise misrepresented the matter in saying, "*there was a failure in Beresford's operations*," and that "*there seemed to be some misunderstanding between him and Silveira*."

Page 104.—Adverting to my praise of Trant's advance to the Vouga, the writer says, "*the author, for a military man, has an extraordinary method of separating the subordinate or executive officer from the general under whose direction that officer acts*."

Answer.—General Trant assured me that his advance

to the Vouga was, as I have described it, his own sudden and spontaneous act.

Page 110.—The following passage from my work is quoted. "*Early in June marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed on Castello Branco,*" upon which the writer observes, "*lord Beresford was neither directed on that place, nor did he go there.*"

Answer.—Lord Londonderry, in his "Narrative of the War," p. 305, says, "marshal Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the north, *was ordered to proceed with one British and two Portuguese brigades by Castello Branco to the Tietar.*" As his lordship was adjutant-general at the time, and must, therefore, have issued the order himself, I adopted the fact without a suspicion of its authenticity.

Page 115.—This pamphlet says, "the duke del Parque would not give lord Beresford some *British biscuit left in store at Ciudad Rodrigo by the commissariat of sir John Moore's army*;" and he appends to this the following note: "*Colonel Napier, with his usual inaccuracy, says, by order of sir Arthur Wellesley,*"—that is, I said, "*the store was formed by sir Arthur Wellesley's order.*"

Answer.—Extract from sir A. Wellesley's correspondence: To the Marquis Wellesley Merida, September 1st, 1809.
"It is a curious circumstance respecting marshal Beresford's corps, that the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo actually refused to allow them to have 30,000 lbs. of 100,000 lbs. of biscuit which *I had prepared there* in case the operations of the army should be directed to that quarter."

I come now to the last, but not the least, of this writer's mistakes. In my history it is said that marshal Beresford was so credulous of French weakness in the number of troops, as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajoz, that "Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to 8000 or 10,000 soldiers;" upon which, the pamphleteer (p. 112) remarks, "lord Beresford will, I apprehend, be surprised at this information: although reading of events with which he had no inconsiderable concern, he must feel himself indebted to lieutenant-colonel Napier for a great deal of very important intelligence relating both to them and to himself. The above relation will, I suspect, be received by his lordship as news of the very newest

description. I doubt whether lord Beresford, in the whole course of his life, ever communicated with the junta of Badajoz—"Of course the historian will give his authority for the fact."—"This public announcement to the junta of Badajoz—this numerical accuracy with which lord Beresford's estimate of Soult's force is set down—all these particularities remind one vastly of the veracious anecdotes of the worthies of the 'School for Scandal,' and I can only reply to them in the words of sir Benjamin,—the lieutenant-colonel's account is more circumstantial, I confess, but I believe mine is the only true one for all that."

Authority.—Letter from his excellency marshal Beresford, to the junta of Badajoz; extracted from the British Press of July 7, 1809.

"To his Excellency the President and the Lords of Junta of Estremadura.

"I have already transmitted you an account of the forces I sent to Alcantara, and which were obliged to abandon that position to the enemy on account of his superior numbers. The resistance they made, however, was highly honourable to the small corps which ultimately remained to defend that pass, though the loss and damage sustained by the town in consequence gave me great concern. I have again sent to Alcantara four battalions, under the same brave officer, colonel Mayne. I flatter myself that in a short time all that part of Spain will be freed from its oppressors. I have much pleasure in transmitting to the junta copies of the letters received yesterday from Galicia, and congratulate it on the favourable appearance of things in that province. You already know that upon the defeat of the corps of marshal Soult by general sir Arthur Wellesley, the enemy were reduced to a most disgraceful flight, abandoning their ammunition, &c., and the soldiers throwing away their arms; after which, they made such forced marches, that it was impossible to come up with the main body of the army before it had passed the bridge of Breuga. Our troops followed them with all expedition to that place, between which and Alariz we made some prisoners. I have previously communicated to all the juntas and generals in Galicia, the probability that *the remnant of this army,*

amounting only to about 8000 or 10,000 men, without any cannon or ammunition, and in every respect in the most wretched condition, flying from our troops, would retire into that country, in order that they might be prepared in the best manner to receive them ; and I entertain no doubt that the consequences of the capture of Lugo, and of Ney having left Gallicia, will be fatal to Soult. I have the honour to remain, with the most profound respect,

“ Your most obedient servant,

“ G. C. BERESFORD.”

Coimbra, May 29.

Is that sufficient authority? or will it be called a forgery, as some other letters have been, because the initial of the first Christian name is wrong? But having now tracked the pamphleteer through most of his tortuous statements, I pray my readers to observe that this mass of errors and scurrility is contained in a pamphlet of less than 130 pages; that it is the production of a writer who acknowledges to have spent three months in its preparation, because he was “*anxious that nothing should be published in reply to my mistakes which could be justly cited as a mistake of his own;*” and who, after roughly noticing even a false punctuation, in such an extensive work as mine, lays down the following rules for the guidance of contemporary historians. “*That they should not attempt to go farther than a bare register of facts.*” That they must “*cast aside all evidence which would be scouted in a court of justice;*” and that they must “*never allow the words, ‘it is said,’ to disgrace their work.*” In fine, that the public must be content, by a species of comparative anatomy, to judge of the size and form of the great transactions of the world from a few dry bones presented by grubbers for small facts.

Since writing the above, “*Further Strictures*” from the same pen have appeared. The author is surprised that his former admonitions have had no effect upon me; perhaps he will be more surprised to find that his present corrections are likely to have the same fate; for as they are written in the same style, and of about as much value in point of accuracy as those I have just analyzed, it would be waste of time to notice them; although, being twice as copious as

the former, I, like greater authors, might thus hope to see commentaries upon my work more voluminous than the work itself. Sir Benjamin D'Urban has however mixed himself up in this controversy, and his objection shall have an answer.

Sir Benjamin's account of the battle I had before me when I wrote mine;—if I have not quoted him, it is because that was the condition on which a copy was placed in my hands;—if I have not followed him as a guide exactly, it is because other information justified me in quitting him at certain points, in matters of fact; and his opinions and conclusions I was in no manner bound to.

1°. I acknowledge an involuntary error in saying marshal Beresford's failure kept lord Wellington for nearly *two years* on the frontier of Portugal. I should have said more than one year; how the mistake crept in I cannot say, but I had already detected and corrected it in my copy for the second edition.

2°. I know that marshal Beresford obeyed Lord Wellington's instructions by crossing the Guadiana at Jerumenha. It is so stated in my third volume, page 498; but lord Wellington had also given him a discretionary power of acting; and to invest Badajoz quickly was the principal object. It is his judgment in the use of that discretionary power that I have censured.

3°. In opposition to sir Benjamin, I adhere to my assertion that marshal Beresford fought an unnecessary battle, and *fought it against his own judgment*. Nor was it upon slight authority that I said the impatient feeling of the army was so strongly represented to him as to affect his decision. I am not bound to name that authority because sir Benjamin chooses to "regard the fact as imaginary," but that lord Beresford fought the battle against his own judgment, is undeniable, or there is no truth in the following extract from general Harvey's journal.

24th May, 1811.—"Met general Beresford, and rode to Vilalba, where there is an old castle," &c. &c. "*The marshal was remarkably communicative as to the policy of fighting at Albuera, which he blames himself much for, depicting the consequences of defeat in most serious colours.*"

Let me return to the Strictures. If marshal Beresford is content to have such a defender, I have no reason to regret

his taste; but should the production reach a second edition, I would advise the writer not to let his authorities contradict his text.

At page 125, he says that sir Alexander Dickson having "*furnished me with the number of guns, I arbitrarily decided as to their calibre.*" But in page 51, Appendix, No. IV., general D'Urban (whom I followed) sets down, under the head of artillery employed in the battle of Albuera, six German, six Portuguese, and six British nine-pounders; wherefore, if three sixes make eighteen, *I did not "arbitrarily decide as to the calibre."*

At page 35, it is said, "*as to the author's assertion that the Tagus might have been forded after a week's dry weather, nothing can be more imaginary. The whole allied army, and the whole French army, know the absurd incorrectness of this statement.*" But at p. 3, Appendix, sir Benjamin D'Urban says, "*The Tagus between Golegaõ and Rio Moinhos was known to offer several fords after a few days dry weather.*"

At page 36, it is said, "The whole army was about 20,000;" but at page 13, Appendix, that there were 20,000 infantry and 1400 cavalry, besides artillery.

At page 75, it is affirmed, Beresford could form his bridge and pass over his troops in the sight and in despite of the French; and that it was "*perfectly impossible for them to frustrate the operation;*" but at page 12, in the Appendix, general D'Urban says, that the French "*might have opposed the operation with a rational prospect of success.*"

At page 77, "the night was so dark that the enemy neither was *nor could be seen;*" but at page 12 of the Appendix, sir Benjamin D'Urban says, that the enemy "*observed the heights occupied,*" and gave up his design.

At page 80, "*the army did not halt at Olivenza;*" but at page 13 of the Appendix, sir Benjamin says, that the army being without provisions, "*encamped in the woods round that town.*"

At page 162, "*the sudden shift of wind which colonel Napier has introduced with somewhat of dramatic effect, to clear away the obscurity of mist and smoke in which he had veiled the scene, never occurred;*" but at page 31 of the Appendix, sir B. D'Urban says, "*the wind at this moment blew aside the smoke and rain.*"

These indications suffice to prove that my opponent is not invulnerable ; and, with regard to his other assertions, I reply generally, that there is not a single fact related by me for which I cannot produce some authority ; and, before my work is completed, I will do so, on all contradicted points important enough to require it. Everybody knows that to fix exactly the different periods of a battle, and the particular circumstances, is nearly impossible, and I am ready to admit, that in certain minor points of that of Albuera, this writer seems to be better informed than either general D'Urban or myself ; wherefore, in a second edition, I will avail myself not only of his corrections, but also of other recent information, which will show, that both at Albuera and at Campo Mayor, lord Beresford's errors were much greater than I have represented them to be. I cannot indeed promise to say with Dumouriez, who it would seem is angler enough to know a trout from a gudgeon, that marshal Beresford at Albuera "*did more than Cæsar at Pharsalia*," but I will endeavour to chastise "*the spirit of the inquisitor*," and retain only the "*liberal*" in my composition ; and meanwhile this writer, who, "being pestered with a popinjay answers he knows not what," may recover temper, which, next to "parmaceti, is the sovereignest thing on earth for an inward bruise."

From the labour of personal justification, I now turn to the more grateful task of replying to some unfounded criticisms on sir John Moore's campaign.

It might be imagined, that when time had blunted the keen edge of political malice, Moore's heroic death would at least have arrested censure which could not be substantiated ; but in this, as in other human affairs, all opinions are not to be bound in one fetter, yet I trust to show that the authors whose censures I allude to, have nothing but opinions, unsupported by facts, to offer to the world. To effect this, however, in a concise manner, I must again advert to "*Colonel Sorrel's Notes*," classing them with "*The Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*," and "*The Life of the Duke of Wellington*," and quoting and answering all three indifferently, as their arguments or assertions present themselves.

They accuse sir John Moore—1°. Of vacillation and of

losing time at Salamanca. 2°. Of taking counsel from others, rather than from his own judgment. 3°. Of neglecting Galicia as a defensive position. And that it may be seen they do so, I will put down the words of each writer.

“That time was lost at Salamanca is a matter of fact, and a subject of regret. The value of a day, or of an hour in war, is great. It is in vain to ask what might have been the consequences of a movement into the heart of Spain which was never made, and which, according to able and acute men, should never have been contemplated; but it is certain that between that measure and a retreat on Portugal, sir John Moore wavered long in his designs.”—Life of the Duke of Wellington, page 163.

“Part of his difficulties must be admitted to have proceeded from his own arrangements.” “While the infantry proceeded by Almeida, the cavalry and artillery were directed to advance by Merida and Truxillo; and the consequence was, that the difficulty of collecting his army was prodigiously enhanced, and sir John Moore was compelled to remain above a month inactive at Salamanca. Precious time was there lost. The thoughts of the general were bent only on retreat. The army did not move until the eleventh hour, and action was unfortunately delayed till the precise period when action could no longer be available.”—Annals of the Campaign, page 102.


“It is much to be lamented that sir John Moore did not feel himself fully at liberty to follow the dictates of his own excellent judgment, instead of yielding to suggestions and opinions which, being founded on false data, scarcely merited attention.”—Notes on the Campaigns, 1808-9, p. 41.

Thus, these three writers agree in censuring sir John Moore, yet, in unfolding their own views, all disagree on what he should have done. The author of *“The Life”* would have had him retreat at once upon Portugal; the author of *“The Notes”* insists on the primary importance of defending Galicia; and the author of *“The Annals”* vacillates between that, and *“retiring,”* as he phrases it, *“across the Tagus to the south.”* Their discrepancy shows a variety of fancy, but no difference of judgment, because none of them have examined the subject with a reference to facts. This shall be demonstrated.

"He was compelled to remain a month inactive at Salamanca."—Annals.

Two thousand men, the head of Sir John Moore's column, reached Salamanca the 13th of November, the rear did not arrive until the 25th, and on the 11th of December the army marched towards Sahagun ; thus, even supposing that the troops could have commenced operations the day after they arrived, the month is reduced to fifteen days. But were those days wasted in inactivity? Was it inactivity to keep so near a powerful enemy until Baird and Hope effected their junction? Was it inactivity in that short period, amidst a thousand conflicting and false representations and reports, to fix the true character of the Spanish insurrection, and with so sure a judgment, that every operation founded upon a different view failed, even to the end of the war? Was it inactivity to have arranged the means of throwing the army into the heart of Spain? and when the battle of Tudela, breaking that measure, obliged Moore to prepare for a retreat, was it inactivity, amidst such difficulties and anxieties, and without money to establish sure intelligence, and upon new prospects opening, to arrange a forward movement in the face of three hundred thousand men, at the same time changing the line of operations from Portugal to Galicia? Are these things the work of a moment?

Suppose, however, that the artillery under Hope had moved with sir John Moore, and had been at Salamanca on the 25th November, the junction with Baird was still to be effected, and the separation of that general was not the work of Moore. Would this writer then have had the latter advance with fourteen or fifteen thousand men to Burgos, or to Aranda de Duero, or to Madrid? If to the last, Baird must have been abandoned, because the fourth corps, which was at Rio Seco the 24th November, would have intercepted his line of march. Burgos? He was still too late, because Blake's and Belvedere's armies had been dispersed on the 10th and 11th. But say they had not been dispersed; then the arrangement of sending Hope by Madrid, was better than marching in one column to Salamanca, inasmuch as the latter, by being enlarged and troubled with a great train of carriages and guns, could not



have reached that town so soon as the 25th; whereas, by moving as they did on separate roads, all marched more rapidly, and Hope could have united at Burgos, with a difference of only twelve leagues, and at Aranda, with a difference only of one league, in the distance traversed. Wherefore it is clear that sir John Moore's mind was not "continually bent on retreat," that his arrangements did not in any manner oblige him to remain a month inactive at Salamanca, and in fine, that he was not inactive at all.

But, says the author of the *Annals*, "*the time chosen for action was precisely when action could not avail.*" And "*On the advance of the British, Soult, as a matter of course, would have fallen back to Burgos, where his corps would have effected a junction with that of Junot. Nothing therefore could be more visionary than the project of defeating Soult.*"

Is there any foundation in fact for all this? Sir John Moore reasoned thus, "Soult knows nothing of my march—he may be surprised and beaten. If he retreats, the French grand communications are exposed; in either case Napoleon must come to his succour. If he comes with a small force, he also may be fought withal. If with a large force, I incur danger, but a diversion for the south is effected." What was the result? Soult instead of *retiring as "a matter of course,"* stood his ground, the emperor came back with his whole army, and the only thing visionary is the argument of this writer.

"*It is certain that he long wavered.*"—Life of Wellington.

When only two thousand British had reached Salamanca, Blake and Belvedere, whose armies were to cover the junction of Moore's divisions, were utterly routed, and the French cavalry entered Valladolid. Moore then told the Junta that if the enemy advanced, he must go back; they did not advance, and he remained at Salamanca.

On the 25th his column was closed up, and on the 27th, the state of affairs being more clearly known, sir John Moore prepared, as we have seen, to throw himself into the heart of Spain.

On the 28th news of Castaños' destruction, and of Napoleon's movement on Madrid arrived, and as the wings of the British army were not then united to the centre, the

proposed measure was no longer practicable. Wherefore sir John Moore resolved to retreat upon Portugal, as soon as his artillery and cavalry, under general Hope, should have joined him.

The 4th of December Hope arrived; the 5th, information came that Napoleon was resisted at Madrid, and by the 7th, from every quarter, came news, which whether from natives or Englishmen, private or official, was of the same tenor—namely, that the enthusiasm of Spain was again awakened; moreover, Napoleon's march from Burgos to the capital, not only permitted a junction with Baird's division, but opened a point to the attack of the united British army. On the 7th, therefore, sir John Moore, seizing the opportunity thus suddenly offered, resolved to advance to Sahagun, thereby meeting new combinations with fresh dispositions. Is that wavering? Is a general to shut his eyes to what is passing around him, and stupidly follow a plan preconceived upon circumstances totally different from the actual ones?

But "*he should have followed his own excellent judgment,*" says the author of the Notes.—"*He should have retired across the Tagus to the south,*" says the author of the Annals.

He could not have done both. When Napoleon was at Burgos, Moore might have retired across the Tagus; but the author of the Annals speaks of the period when the advance to Sahagun was commenced; at that time, Napoleon was at Madrid with 60,000 men, and the 4th corps was moving on Talavera; wherefore any movement towards the Tagus would have been an advance, and sir John Moore's excellent judgment certainly would not have let him call an advance a retreat. But did he not follow his own judgment? Mr. Frere and the Spaniards wanted him to move upon Madrid, and he went towards Burgos. Sir David Baird wanted him to take a defensive position in Galicia, and he made a forward movement to Sahagun. Others wanted him to retreat to Portugal; and, militarily speaking, that was most advisable. Moore said so; but the awakening enthusiasm offered a hope for Spain, and he advanced on political grounds, calculating, as indeed happened, that he should always be able to retreat by Galicia,

which was not worse than to retreat by Portugal. There was danger, but war is never a safe game ; and when, as in this case, all the difficulties are foreseen, and boldly met or skilfully evaded, a dangerous operation is not rash, but great.

Let me now prove that he acted upon such a calculation,—that he foresaw and judged all the difficulties and results, military and political—that he adopted no man's recommendations, but executed his own plan.

Salamanca, December 6th.—“ What is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us with whatever risk it may be attended ; yet I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for, if the bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it.” Sir John
Moore's
Corre-
spondence.

Salamanca, 8th December.—“ Madrid still holds out, and I have some reason to believe that efforts are making to collect a force at Toledo, and a still larger one on the other side of the Sierra Morena : as long as there is a chance we must not abandon this country.” Ibid.

Salamanca, 9th December.—“ After Castaños' defeat the French marched for Madrid, the inhabitants flew to arms,” &c. “ This is the first instance of enthusiasm shown ; there is a hope that the example may be followed, and the people be roused, in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and have taken measures to form our junction, whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid : we are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope ; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail, or, at any rate, they may not be able to resist—in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever.” Sir John
Moore's
Journal.

11th December.—“ I shall assemble the army at Valladolid.”—“ By this movement I shall threaten the French communications, which will make some diversion in favour of the Spaniards, if they can take advantage of it ; but I much fear they will not move, but leave me to fight the battle by myself, in which case I must keep my communications open with Astorga and Galicia.” Sir John
Moore's
Corre-
spondence.

Sahagun, December 24th.—“ I gave up the march on

Carrion, which had never been undertaken but with the view of attracting the enemy's attention from the armies assembling in the south, and in the hopes of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps, while it was still thought that the British were retreating into Portugal."

"*The experiment failed,*" says the author of the Annals.

In what manner? "The object of my movement," says sir John Moore, on the 12th of December, "*is to threaten the French communications, and attract their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and favour any movement which may be made by the Spanish armies forming to the south of the Tagus.*" Now, what was the result? The 5th corps left Zaragoza; the 4th corps withdrew from Estremadura; the 2nd corps came from New Castile; the 8th corps from Navarre; Napoleon, with 50,000 men, returned from Madrid—the whole plan of his campaign was overturned! Cuesta was then enabled to move an army from the Morena to the Tagus, Infantado to obtain refuge at Cuenca, Palacios to descend into La Mancha; the siege of Zaragoza was delayed, Portugal was saved, and the conquest of Andalusia deferred. This is to fail! And it is thus that, turning from the steady light of facts, this writer endeavours, by the feeble glimmer of his own imagination, to trace Moore's career!

These authors seem bad generals in the plains of Castile; let us see if they are better on the mountains of Galicia.

"*Had the information of the general, with regard to the country traversed by his army, been more accurate and extensive, he would have known that there was no road leading to Betanzos and Coruña by which the enemy could at any season have advanced with rapidity sufficient to have endangered his communications—in fact, the roads on the right and left, occupied by the British, most difficult at any season, must, at the period in question, when covered with deep snow, and intersected by swollen torrents from the mountains, have been utterly impracticable.*"—*Annals*, pages 112, *et seq.*

The brigades of Alten and Crawford, quitting Moore's main body near Astorga, marched by Domingo Flores and the Puente de Bibey to Orense and Tuy. From Orense there is a cavalry road to St. Jago; from Tuy there is an artillery

road by Ponte Vedra to St. Jago, and from St. Jago there is a royal road to Coruña. Soult desired Ney to march the whole of the 6th corps by this route to Coruña, and general Marchand's division did actually so move, reaching St. Jago soon after the battle of Coruña.

From Villa Franca, Franceschi marched with his cavalry into the Val des Orres, and then, remounting the Minho, rejoined Soult between Villa Franca and Lugo. This march took place during Moore's retreat; and, after that event, Soult moved from Coruña by Ponte Vedra and Tuy to Orense, sending La Houssaye's dragoons through Mellid to the same place: from Orense there is also a direct route to St. Jago.

From Lugo there is a carriage road to St. Jago, through Mellid. This was the route by which sir John Moore intended to retreat to Vigo, and along which Mackenzie Frazer's division did actually march and then return, and there were magazines at all three places.

From Lugo there is a road by Monforte to the Val des Orres, closely flanking the royal road from Villa Franca, by which Moore retired. Soult marched his whole corps by this route when operating against Romana, after the retreat from Oporto.

From Benevente there is a high road by Mombuey and Puebla de Senabria leading to Orense. Soult also traversed this route in June, 1809.

From the Asturias there is a road by the Conceja de Ibas to Lugo. This route was followed by Ney, in May, 1809.

From the Asturias there is a high road through Mondonedo to Betanzos and Coruña, and there is also the coast road by Ribadeo to Ferrol. These roads were marched by Ney and by Romana in April and May; and moreover, Romana moved from Mondonedo to the sources of the Neyra, and thence into the Val des Orres; his route being by the line of the Asturian frontier, and consequently flanking the royal road of Lugo. So much for "*impracticable roads*."

But it is the opinion of these writers that sir John Moore ought to have defended Galicia.

"It has been matter of regret to many that sir John Moore was not led to regard with a more favourable eye the pro-

ject of defending Galicia. No part of Spain offers equal advantages for a defensive war."

"The documents given in the appendix to Colonel Napier's history, abundantly prove that it was to this quarter that the anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed."—*Annals*, p. 104, *et seq.*

"Perhaps it is to be regretted that the suggestion thrown out by sir David Baird's letter of the 8th December, from Villa Franca, was not adopted."

"Had the British army been collected on the frontier of Galicia, about the middle of December, there can be little doubt that it would have been able to have maintained itself, at least during the winter; and long before spring the face of affairs was completely changed by the departure of Napoleon, and of the force which followed him, to the Austrian war."

"When the suggestion was offered, our strength was unimpaired, our equipment perfect, and the great body of the French was occupied with Madrid."

"Lugo and other points might have been fortified, positions taken up and strengthened, depôts established, and, by a judicious disposition of our force, the danger of being turned by the road through Orense, and by those from the north of Portugal and the Asturias, might have been sufficiently guarded against."

"The opinion of Bonaparte on the influence which the occupation of Galicia, by an enemy to France, might have had on the war in Spain, is recorded in a letter which was written under his dictation to general Savary."—*Sorrel's Notes*, page 41, *et seq.*

The argument of the author of the "*Annals*," being but a meagre copy of colonel Sorrel's "*Notes*," to answer one is to answer both; but previous to examining the question of the defence of Galicia, I will mark some stumbling-blocks in the way of both.

1°. On the 8th of December, say the "*Notes*," "*our strength was unimpaired, and the French were occupied with Madrid.*"

The strength of the British army was the same on the 24th as on the 8th of December: no loss, save a few men hurt in the cavalry skirmishes, had been sustained. Madrid

capitulated the 3d of December; on the 4th the French took possession; and Napoleon was so little occupied with it on the 8th of December, that he had, on the 4th, detached his cavalry in pursuit of Castaños's fugitive army; sent the 1st corps into La Mancha, to menace Andalusia; and the 4th corps to Talavera, to form an advanced guard for the march against Lisbon!

2°. "*The anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed towards Gallicia.*"—Annals.

This expression is not very intelligible, but, taken with the context, it means that Napoleon feared opposition in Gallicia more than in any other quarter; yet two pages after we find the same author asserting that Moore should have "*retired across the Tagus,*" because "*there it was that he was most dreaded by Napoleon.*"

3°. The documents quoted from my appendix, instead of being favourable to, are directly opposed to the views of these writers.

Before the battle of Rio Seco, Napoleon tells Savary that "*Bessieres had to fight for the communications of the French, and that a wound, received by him, would give a spasm to the whole army.*" Nothing could be better expressed or more applicable to the state of affairs. The French then in the Peninsula were about 135,000, of which 48,000 were in Portugal and Catalonia. Of the remainder, 50,000 were scattered in Valencia, Andalusia, and the borders of Murcia. 10,000 were at Zaragoza, some at Madrid, and only 15,000 *under Bessieres* were left to protect the communications from Cuesta and Blake, whose united forces, exceeding 40,000, and containing the best body of regular troops in Spain, were then entering the plains of Leon; moreover the king was on his journey to the capital, and had Bessieres been defeated, would have been forced to fly. It was, therefore, the comparative strength of the Spaniards on this point, combined with the danger of the king, and the scattered state of the other French corps, especially that of Dupont's, which drew Napoleon's attention, not the geographical advantages of Gallicia.

What a vast difference, also, between the circumstances at the two periods brought into comparison by these writers!

When the emperor wrote, the heads of the French invasion were engaged in Valencia, Andalusia, and Aragon; the whole country was in insurrection, Spanish armies gathering in every quarter, and the Spanish courage untried, while the French communications were protected by a force only one third of that opposed to it. When Moore retreated, 90,000 men, that is, four times his force, were united in pursuit of him. All the Spanish armies had been dispersed, the insurrections quelled, Zaragoza menaced by 35,000 French, 20,000 at Talavera, 30,000 in La Mancha, 10,000 in Madrid, Burgos in a state of defence, many thousand soldiers distributed on the communications and on the lines of correspondence, and 50,000 were marching under Napoleon upon Astorga. All that great man's combinations were compact, his communications protected, and the head of the principal operation turned not, as in the former case, away from, but against Galicia, and this, not because of its geographical advantages (which it is evident he disregarded when he went from Burgos to Madrid, although he knew Baird's division was at Astorga), but because the united British army was on his communications. "Napoleon's dread," and "Napoleon's anxieties," sound grandly; but his arguments should be understood before they are quoted. At that time he feared neither British nor Spanish armies in Galicia, nor any other part; his force was overpowering, and the head of his invasion wherever he chose to place it. If Moore had retired on Lisbon, Napoleon would have followed him to Lisbon. As Moore went to Galicia, against that point the emperor immediately drove.

"Bessieres is to-day at Medina Rio Seco: he will open communication with Portugal, force the rebels into Galicia, and seize Leon."

"If Cuesta throws himself into Galicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will be improved. If he does so after a defeat, it will be still better."

"By driving Cuesta into Galicia, we deprive him of his communications with Madrid, Andalusia, and Extremadura."

"The two important points, and where they can make a

real regular warfare, are Galicia and Andalusia, because the troops of San Roque, of Cadiz, and Algarve, are nearly 25,000 men, who have taken part with the sedition of Seville; and all those who were at Oporto have taken part with the rebels of Galicia."

"Not a peasant of the vallies but sees that the affairs of Spain at this moment depend upon Bessieres. How foolish, then, it is to have in this great affair voluntarily given twenty chances against him!"

"A defeat of Bessieres will be a blow at the heart; it will be felt at all the extreme points of the army."

"The army of Bessieres ought to have at the least 8000 men more to obviate all chances against him."

"The great object of the army's efforts should be to secure Madrid. Madrid can only be menaced by the army of Galicia."

"If Bessieres is checked, his object should be to protect Burgos."

Such were Napoleon's expressions;—not a word about the geographical importance of Galicia,—he only considers the danger from such a comparatively large Spanish force entering the plains of Leon: and, in his own campaign, he did not move against Madrid until he believed Moore was in full retreat upon Portugal. The instant he discovered his mistake, he returned with incredible rapidity, not because he feared opposition in Galicia, but because it was necessary to protect his communications in the plains of Leon. Soult was in the same situation as Bessieres had been, but as the British were more formidable opponents than the Spaniards, Napoleon came with his whole army to protect the communications. Thus it is clear that sir John Moore's march against Soult was in the very spirit of Napoleon's warfare; and they who would have had him go to Galicia, understood neither his view nor the emperor's reasoning.

Let us now examine whether Galicia was really capable of being defended. The arguments, or rather lamentations, of these writers, rests on a letter of sir David Baird; it will be fitting, therefore, to see how far their foundation is secure.

Sir David Baird commanded only a division, and his knowledge of the real state of affairs was necessarily more confined than that of the commander-in-chief. He was

